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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Summits and All That

The only way to test the assumption that the events of the last week have created the potential for a major change in US-Soviet relations and consequently in the international political scene is to act on it. We can act in two directions--Berlin and disarmament. There is reason to believe that these are complementary not competing possibilities.

Discussions on both subjects have been going forward and there exist channels for continuing them; however, disarmament discussions have been languishing and Berlin discussions are almost dead. It seems reasonable as a first hypothesis to assume that in order for a useful initiative to be taken, it must be taken in a new channel. A bilateral summit directed at reaching agreements in principle on Berlin and disarmament, to be followed by foreign ministers' meetings of four powers would seem to be the best way to organize an initiative with a maximum chance of securing big results. The powers involved in the German negotiation include all those that would be required to deal with nuclear test-ban and non-diffusive agreements; if more on the disarmament front is attempted, a wider forum will be necessary. There are two kinds of counter arguments to be made against a bilateral summit. The first is that our allies do not like it. If we assess the probability of a useful outcome as being at all high, we are justified in ignoring this consideration. The other is that the internal turmoil in Moscow is such as to make it unlikely that the Soviets want a bilateral summit now. The assertion of fact upon which this argument rests is probably true; however, the conclusion does not follow. Indeed, it is precisely the existence of turmoil which makes the opportunity for a productive summit. Absent uncertainty and an ongoing prospect of re-evaluation on the Soviets' side, it is unlikely that we could achieve any significant

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change in the terms on which we confront each other. Further, a Berlin summit properly arranged may indeed be a way of avoiding what must be a most difficult problem for the Soviets in entering into any negotiations at the moment--that of appearing to the rest of the world as bowing to U. S. demands. This argument points up in turn another condition of a successful summit, that we view our situation in relation to the Soviets as symmetrical; namely, that recent events have enabled us both to see with greater clarity where our joint interests lie and how it is in our joint interest to limit occasions of conflict and direct confrontation between us and to reduce the potentiality for any remaining occasions to escalate into general war.

On disarmament, the minimum results worthwhile aiming at appear to be a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a nuclear non-diffusion agreement. Some further trimmings could be added to this minimum in a way of an agreement to refrain from putting weapons into outer space and agreement on a list of measures to reduce the dangers of surprise attack. The former appear easy; the latter not particularly significant.

Khrushchev's recent letters to the President suggest that the events have themselves been enough to move the Soviets from their previous position on a comprehensive test ban treaty to an acceptance in principle of inspection, although this is not yet evident in Tsarapkin's statements at Geneva. It will be necessary for us, however, to take some risks with respect to the number of control posts and the number of inspections. This is a problem which we have examined fairly carefully, and we have the bases for decision on this.

On Berlin, our problems are more difficult. The course of events has probably caused the Soviets to abandon any plans they have for cutting off allied military access in a drastic way in the near future. If by the immediate threat in Berlin we mean the threat of a sharp enough interference with allied access to lead to a military confrontation, we can then say that the immediate threat has vanished for some (indefinite) time. If, however, we view the existence of even last Summer's degree of tension and uncertainty and the prospect that it might increase at any time as in themselves undesirable, then we can say that the Berlin crisis is still with us. Moreover, the

pains of the present situation to the Berliners themselves and the importance of the German problem in intra-European politics, argue that the problem demands a major effort absent a Berlin crisis in the immediate sense.

The minimum results we might seek in Berlin would almost certainly require substantial movement by us from our past positions if we are to do more than ratify the status quo in the narrowest sense which we have failed to do in a year-and-a-half of effort. An international access authority with full control, ideally, of an autobahn, a railway line and a canal route, plus operation of the relevant airways, would be our access guarantee. In addition, we must ask for some provisions covering movement of persons, both between East and West Berlin, and East and West Germany. This might well take the form of minimum quotas which can be revised upwards by mutual agreement but not downwards, and with the right to reject specific individuals on the admitting authority of either side. Further, we should seek a clear contractual basis for the presence of western troops. It might be desirable to make West Berlin legally part of the Federal Republic, but subject to certain limitations on the kinds of armaments and the number of troops that can be put into it, on the basis of reciprocal engagements and conditions for East Berlin. This would be useful as a precedent for an arms control agreement. The case against this particular provision in the settlement is the traditional German fear that we would be contracting out of our responsibility for the defense of West Berlin. This is also in large part the case for it. On balance, my judgment leads me to be for it.

In order to achieve so much, what must we be prepared to give? At a minimum, enough recognition of the authorities in East Germany to accomplish some of the Soviet purposes. This would certainly include defining the borders of Germany to the east, as well as the sector borders. It would certainly include allowing the East German membership in the access authority. It would include that degree of recognition implied by East German bilateral negotiations with the Federal Republic on a variety of subjects. It could include an explicit declaration that Germany would be unified on the basis of discussion and agreement between the authorities of the two parts of Germany. If we add renunciation of the use of force to change the boundaries between the two, and mutual declarations

of non-aggressive intent between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, we have the substance of the 10 points which we never succeeded in selling either to the Germans or to the Soviets last year.

The double package of Berlin and disarmament proposals might be negotiable on a bilateral basis. To test its negotiability, however, we would have to take the step of substituting a policy of informing our allies for a policy of consulting them in advance. It is not clear that the week's experience has had a powerful enough effect on the principal ally concerned, the Federal Republic, to warrant the conclusion that we can achieve this result. But here again only the attempt can provide the test.

Having gone so far, it may be worthwhile to go much further. Much further in the Berlin direction would involve trading some kind of all-Berlin solution involving neutralization, with either Eur-power or UN troops and guarantee, for explicit recognition of East Germany and a German peace treaty. The treaty would provide for ultimate unification and contain the kinds of provisions described above for movement between the two Germanies and between each Germany and Berlin. To make this offer now would certainly offend the West German Government deeply. In my own judgment, the temperature of last week's events was not sustained at a high enough level over a long enough period of time to make this proposal acceptable either to the Russians or the Germans. It might be made more acceptable to the Russians and less acceptable to the Germans by adding to it provisions limiting the number of troops in both Germanies and providing some troop-free zone for a short distance around Berlin and on either side of the boundary between East and West Germany. This would be very difficult for the West Germans to accept unless NATO integration went a great deal further than it has gone to date.

On disarmament it is obvious that the step beyond is a first-stage agreement of some sort. Here again the difference between the U. S. and Soviet positions is very substantial. Even if we are prepared to move a good deal in dismantling bases, and speeding up the rate of disarmament in the first state, we would be very far from the Soviet position, which calls for something like nuclear parity by the end of the first stage. The experience of last week probably reinforces our judgment that we are not now ready for nuclear parity.

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With disarmament, as with Berlin, the conclusion seems to be that a radical change is unlikely. Thus, the final question is: Is there enough in the limited program in two spheres to justify the risks of summit failure and alliance alienation? This writer votes "yes", loudly. (Oxymoron?)

Carl Kayser

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